CVE-2019-11034

When processing certain files, PHP EXIF extension in versions 7.1.x below 7.2.8, 7.2.x below 7.2.17 and 7.3.x below 7.3.4 can be caused to read past allocated buffer in exif_process_IFD_TAG function. This may lead to information disclosure or crash.
Source: NIST
CVE-2019-11034

CVE-2019-10306

A sandbox bypass vulnerability in Jenkins ontrack Plugin 3.4 and earlier allowed attackers with control over ontrack DSL definitions to execute arbitrary code on the Jenkins master JVM.
Source: NIST
CVE-2019-10306

CVE-2019-10305

A missing permission check in Jenkins XebiaLabs XL Deploy Plugin in the Credential#doValidateUserNamePassword form validation method allows attackers with Overall/Read permission to initiate a connection to an attacker-specified server.
Source: NIST
CVE-2019-10305

CVE-2018-17168

PrinterOn Enterprise 4.1.4 contains multiple Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities in the Administration page. For example, an administrator, by following a link, can be tricked into making unwanted changes to a printer (Disable, Approve, etc).
Source: NIST
CVE-2018-17168

CVE-2019-10304

A cross-site request forgery vulnerability in Jenkins XebiaLabs XL Deploy Plugin in the Credential#doValidateUserNamePassword form validation method allows attackers to initiate a connection to an attacker-specified server.
Source: NIST
CVE-2019-10304

CVE-2019-10303

Jenkins Azure PublisherSettings Credentials Plugin 1.2 and earlier stored credentials unencrypted in the credentials.xml file on the Jenkins master where they could be viewed by users with access to the master file system.
Source: NIST
CVE-2019-10303

CVE-2019-10300

A cross-site request forgery vulnerability in Jenkins GitLab Plugin 1.5.11 and earlier in the GitLabConnectionConfig#doTestConnection form validation method allowed attackers to connect to an attacker-specified URL using attacker-specified credentials IDs obtained through another method, capturing credentials stored in Jenkins.
Source: NIST
CVE-2019-10300

CVE-2019-10301

A missing permission check in Jenkins GitLab Plugin 1.5.11 and earlier in the GitLabConnectionConfig#doTestConnection form validation method allowed attackers with Overall/Read permission to connect to an attacker-specified URL using attacker-specified credentials IDs obtained through another method, capturing credentials stored in Jenkins.
Source: NIST
CVE-2019-10301

CVE-2019-10302

Jenkins jira-ext Plugin 0.8 and earlier stored credentials unencrypted in its global configuration file on the Jenkins master where they could be viewed by users with access to the master file system.
Source: NIST
CVE-2019-10302

The Android Platform Security Model

Each Android release comes with great new security and privacy features. When it comes to implementing these new features we always look at ways to measure the impact with data that demonstrates the effectiveness of these improvements. But how do these features map to an overall strategy?
Last week, we released a whitepaper describing The Android Platform Security Model. Specifically we discuss:

  • The security model which has implicitly informed the Android platform’s security design from the beginning, but has not been formally published or described outside of Google.
  • The context in which this security model must operate, including the scale of the Android ecosystem and its many form factors and use cases.
  • The complex threat model Android must address.
  • How Android’s reference implementation in the Android Open Source Project (AOSP) enacts the security model.
  • How Android’s security systems have evolved over time to address the threat model.

Android is fundamentally based on a multi-party consent1 model: an action should only happen if the involved parties consent to it. Most importantly, apps are not considered to be fully authorized agents for the user. There are some intentional deviations from the security model and we discuss why these exist and the value that they provide to users. Finally, openness is a fundamental value in Android: from how we develop and publish in open source, to the open access users and developers have in finding or publishing apps, and the open communication mechanisms we provide for inter-app interactions which facilitate innovation within the app ecosystem.
We hope this paper provides useful information and background to all the academic and security researchers dedicated to further strengthening the security of the Android ecosystem. Happy reading!
Acknowledgements: This post leveraged contributions from René Mayrhofer, Chad Brubaker, and Nick Kralevich

Notes


  1. The term ‘consent’ here and in the paper is used to refer to various technical methods of declaring or enforcing a party’s intent, rather than the legal requirement or standard found in many privacy legal regimes around the world. 


Source: Google
The Android Platform Security Model